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CRIMINAL LAW - SELF-DEFENSE - JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ON
SUBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS IN SELF-DEFENSE Do
NOT REQUIRE A SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION ON BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME
Janice Leidholm was charged with murder for the stabbing
death of her husband, Chester Leidholm.1 Janice and Chester had
attended a gun club party where they both consumed large
amounts of alcohol.2 On the return trip home, an argument
developed between Janice and Chester. 3 After they arrived at
home, the arguing did not stop; Chester was shouting and Janice
was crying. 4 Chester began shoving Janice and pushed her to the
ground. 5 Each time Janice attempted to get up, Chester pushed her
down again. 6 When Chester had fallen asleep, Janice went to
the kitchen, got a butcher knife, returned to the bedroom, and
stabbed Chester. 7 According to testimony, the Leidholm marriage
was filled with a mixture of alcohol abuse, moments of kindness,
and moments of violence. 8 At trial Janice Leidholm offered jury
1. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983). The Leidholm stabbing took place in the
early morning hours of August 7, 1981, at the Leidholm farmhouse near Washburn, North Dakota.
Id. at 813.
2. Id. A breathalyzer test administered to Janice Leidholm shortly after the stabbing, at
approximately 3:30 a.m., showed her blood-alcohol content was .17 of 1%. The analysis of a blood
sample from Chester Liedholm showed his blood-alcohol content was .23 of 1%. Id. at 813-14 n.l.
3. Id. at 814.
4. Id
5. d
6. Id. At one point in the lighting, Janice tried to telephone Dave Vollan, a deputy sheriff of
McLcan County: but Chester prevented her from using the phone by shoving her and pushing her
down. Id.
7. Id. Within a matter ofminutes Chesterdied from shock and loss ofblood. Id.
8. Id. at 813. Voluminous testimony was elicited from the children, particularly the four
daughters, concerning the severe and frequent beatings over the years. Testimony disclosed that
various efforts that had been made to deal with these beatings including a visit tojanice's brother to
get away from Chester for a while; asking Chester's brother, Lloyd Leidholm, to talk to Chester
about the beatings; attempts to convince Chester to see a marriage counselor; talks with Deputy
Vollan; running away from the farm tojudge Lundberg's home; attempted suicide; talks tojanice's
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instructions on self-defense based upon the battered woman
syndrome theory. 9 The trial court refused to include the proposed
instructions in its charge to the jury. ' 0 The trial court found Janice
Leidholm guilty of manslaughter and sentenced her to five years
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary with three years of the
sentence suspended."I Leidholm appealed alleging several errors.12
The controlling issue was whether the trial court correctly
instructed the jury on self-defense. 13 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the trial court had incorrectly instructed the jury on
self-defense by using the objective standard of reasonableness.
14
The court also held that if an instruction is modeled after the law of
self-defense that it adopted in Leidholm, which uses the subjective
standard of reasonableness, the trial court need not include a
specific instruction on battered woman syndrome in its charge to
thejury. 15 State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
sister-in-law about the abuse; other attempts to leave; and attempts by the children to prevent or stop
the beatings. Brieftor Appellant at 10-11, State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
9. 334 N.W.2d at 819. Leidholm offered the following proposed instruction on battered woman
syndrome:
A condition known or described by certain witnesses as the 'battered wife
syndrome' if shown by the evidence to have existed in the accused at the time she
allegedly committed the crime charged, is not of itself a defense. However, as a
general rule, whether an accused was assaulted by the victim of the homicide prior to
the commission of a fatal act by the accused may have relevance in determining the
issue tf self-defense.
Whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a
necessary element to the commission of any particular species or degree ofcrime, you
may take into consideration evidence that the accused was or had been assaulted by
the victim in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which the act was
comm tit ted.
Thus, in the crime of murder of which the accused is charged in this case, specific
intent is a necessary element of the crime. So, evidence the accused acted or tailed to
act while suffering the condition known as the 'battered wife syndrome' may be
considered by thejury in determining whether or not the accused acted in self defense.
The weight to be given the evidence on that question, and the significance to attach to
it in relation to all the other evidence in the case, are for you thejury to determine.
Id.
Leidholm's counsel indicated that an instruction almost identical to this was given in United
States v. Ironshield, No. CI-81-40 (D.N.D. 1982) and United States v. Starr, No. C1-79-33
(D.N.D. 1981). 334 N.W.2d at 819 n.7.
For a definition of battered woman syndrome see infra note 19.
10. 334 N.W.2d at 819. In its statement of the law of self-defense, the trial court instructed the
jury, "The circumstances under which she acted must have been such as to produce in the mind of
reasonably prudent persons, regardless of their sex, similarly situated, the reasonable belief that the
other person was then about to kill her or do serious bodily harm to her." Id. at 818.
11. Id. at813.
12. Id. Leidholm raised seven issues on appeal. See infra note 25 for a list of the issues raised on
appeal. Because of the particular disposition of the case, however, the court did not find it necessary
to answer all of them. Id. at 814.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 818. The court concluded that the trial court's instruction improperly stated the law
and was reversible error requiring a new trial. Id. at 819.
15. Id. at 820. The court stated that the correct statement of the law to be applied in a case of
self-defense is:
[A[ defendant's conduct is not to be judged by what a reasonably cautious person
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Generally, one who is not the aggressor in an encounter is
justified in using a reasonable amount of force against his aggressor
when he reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger of
unlawful bodily harm and that the use of such force is necessary to
protect himself from this danger. 16 Wlile the traditional self-
defense doctrine focuses on a single, sudden episode of attack and
defense, 7 the battered wife setting presents a series of attacks,
sometimes over quite a number of years.' 8 Knowledge of this
history helps the jury understand why a defendant felt fear of
unlawful bodily harm in a situation that would not appear
threatening to a reasonable person seeing only the immediate
circumstances. 19
might or might not do or consider necessary to do under like circumstances, but what
he himself in good faith honestly believed and had reasonable ground to believe was
necessary for him to do to protect himself from apprehended death or great bodily
injury.
Id. at 818 (quoting State v. Hazlett, 16 N.D. 426, 441, 113 N.W. 374, 380 (1907)).
16. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 391 (1972) (citing MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.04 comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); Beale, Retreatfrom a Murderous Assault, 16
HARV. L. REV. 567 (1903); Beale, Homicide in Self-Defense, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1903): Perkins,
Self-Defense Re-examined, I U.C.L.A. L. REV. 133 (1954)). The principles of self-defense as it
justification For the torts of assault and battery are very similar to those governing self-defense as a
justification in the criminal law. See PROSSER, TORTS S 19 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 63, 65. 67 (1965).
17. See, e.g., People v. Williams. 240 Ill. 633, 640, 88 N.E. 1053, 1056 (1909). In Williams the
defendant was convicted of murder. The trial court's instructions on self-defense reouired that the
apparent danger should be such danger that was apparent to the jurors from the evidence at the tne,.
aind not such Idanger that might have been apparent to the plaintiff at the time of the incident.
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a man threatened with danger must judge from
appearances the actual state of things. Id. See also State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126,-, 244 S.E. 2d
397, 408 (1978). In Potter the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a killing is excused as being in
self-defense if, from the circumstances as they appeared-at that time, the defendant believes it is
jlecessary to shoot in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm. Id.
18. Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wfe Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 615, 619 (1982) (citing to R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 993, 1014 (1969); People v. Bush, 84
Cal. App. 3d 294, 302-04. 148 Cal. Rptr. 430. 435-37 (1st Dist. 1978) (evidence of the decedent's
priir thrCats as necessary): State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 233-36, 559 P.2d 548, 555-56-
(1977) (limiting the jury's consideration of surrounding acts to those at or immediately before the
killing constituted reversible error). In some instances criminal law accepts determinist accounts of
behavior and, on these occasions, holds external forces responsible for people's conduct. Note, supra,
at 615. Between the two extremes of full responsibility and no responsibility "is conduct where the
actor is strongly influenced by external forces, vet retains some choice in how to respond .. " Id.
This is known as partially determined conduct. Id. The traditional sell-defense doctrine inadequately
accounts flor partially determined conduct. suclh as thc condtuct involved in batcred w ife cases. Id at
616.
19. Note, supra note 18, at 619. A history of the accused's past beatings or an understanding of
battered woman syndrome will aid the jury in determining the reasonableness of the accused's acts.
"Battered woman syndrome" is defined as follows:
JT]he "battered woman syndrome" is a term used to describe the stages of a
battering relationship and the effects of each stage on an abused woman. Dr. Lenore
E. Walker, a pioneer psychologist in the study of battered women, has identilied the
three stages of a battering relationship as: (1) a tension building stage in which minor
incidents of verbal and physical abuse occur; (2) a violent battering stage in which the
woman is often seriously injured; and (3) a compassionate stage in which the man begs
forgiveness, swears his love, and promises never to strike the woman again. Dr.
Walker has found that the repetition of this pattern causes the woman to develop
certain learned reactions. The first stage becomes a red flag. warning a woman that a
severe beating will soon follow. The suppressed fear experienced by the woman in the
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In determining whether the defendant had reasonable grounds
to believe serious bodily harm was imminent, the Supreme Court
of Washington in State v. Wanrow20 held that the jury instruction
first given, which ordered the jury to consider only the
circumstances occurring at or immediately before the killing, was
erroneous. 21 Instead, the court found that the jury is entitled to
consider all the circumstances surrounding the incident. 22
In People v. Bush 23 the California Court of Appeals similarly
determined that in a murder prosecution, when evidence existed
that indicated the deceased made threats of death or great bodily
harm against the defendant, an instruction on the law of the effect
of prior threats was necessary and, if not covered, a correct
instruction on the subject should have been given. 24
State v. Leidholm raised several issues on appeal. 25 The North
first stage may be so disconcerting that she may subconsciously welcome the second
stage in order to return to the peaceful third stage. The repeated disappointments
resulting troto the batterer's false promises of reform in the third stage cause the
woman to develop a "learned helplessness," i.e., the woman believes hers is an
inev itabl, fI'ate and she can do nothing to alter her situation.
Note, Battered Woman Syndrome. Admissibiliy of Expert Testimony for the Defense, 47 Mo. L. REV. 835, 839
(1982) (cit ing L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 56, 56-70 (1979)).
Dr. 'alker indicates that many battered women are able to keep the relationship in the first
stages for years. Women who have been battered over a period of time realize that the first stage's
minor batierings will escalate. When the tension reaches a certain level it triggers the more serious
beatings of the second stage. Because the cycle is repeated,. the battered woman learns to recognize
this pattern of escalation and the level at which her spouse loses control. Id. at 839 n.29.
20. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). In Wanrow Yvonne Wanrow shot and killed William
Wesler in defense of her children against sexual or physical abuse. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d
221, __, 559 P.2d 548, 551 (1977). William Wesler was known to have assaulted Yvonne
Wanrow's niece and nephew. Id. at __, 559 P.2d at 550. For a discussion of women's self-defense
cases see E. Bochnak, WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1981).
21. 88 Wash. 2d at __, 559 P.2d at 556. The court in Wanrow recognized that a narrow time
restriction wrongfully limits the jury's consideration of the event. See id. A victim's conduct prior to
the homicide is relevant in explaining the reasonableness of the defendant's actions. Id.
22. Id. The court emphasized that it was important that the jury be able to consider Wanrow's
knowledge of the victim's past violent acts and reputation for violence. Id. at -, 559 P.2d at 557.
23. 84 Cal. App. 3d 294. 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (Cal. Ci. App. 1978)_ It Bush defendant Alite Bush
stabbed and killed her husband, Gary Bush, during a fight. People v. Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 294,
298. 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). Testimony revealed that Gary Bush had a history
tfbeating his wife. Id. at 299-300, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
24. Id. at 305. 148 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37. The court in Bush relied on the earlier case of People v.
.4oore, which stated that in a prosecution for homicide, when self-defense was relied upon, refusal to
give the defendant's requested instructions regarding the effect of prior threats, combined with the
giving of the prosecution's requested instructions which negatively stated the law of self-defense,
favoring the prosecution, was error. Id. See People v. Moore, 43 Cal. 2d 517, 526, 275 P.2d 485,
491-92 (1954).
25. 334 N.W. 2d 811, 814 (N.D. 1983). In Leidholm the issues raised on appeal were:
1. Whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury on self-defense:
2. Whether the court should adopt a special self-defense instruction on battered
\vonan syndrome:
3. \Vhether defendant had a duty to retreat:
4. \Vhether it ',as error for the trial court to instruct thejury that manslaughter is
a lesser included offense of murder:
5. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a change fsvenue;
6. \Whether tife trial court erred when it denied Leidholin's motion for judginent
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Dakota Supreme Court, however, did not find it necessary to
address all the issues. 26 The first and controlling issue was whether
the trial court correctly instructed the jury on self-defense. 27 Before
directly addressing this issue, however, the court explained the
basic operation of the law of self-defense as set forth in chapter
12.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code. 28
The court stated that conduct which constitutes self-defense
may be either justified or excused. 29 The court noted that a person
who believes the force he uses is necessary to prevent imminent
of'acquittal at the close of the State's case;
7. Whether the jury selection process denied the defendant a fair trial;
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814-23 (N.D. 1983).
26. Id. at 814. The court stated that because of the particular disposition of the case it was not
necessary to answer every issue. Id. The court addressed the issues necessary to ensure proper
disposition of the case on remand. Id. at 819.
27. Id. at 814.
28. Id. North Dakota's criminal code is the product of a massive revision that began in 1971 and
culminated in 1973 with the legislative enactment of Senate Bill No. 2045. Id. See S.B. 2045, 43d.
Leg. Sess. (1973). Most of its provisions are substantially modeled after the Proposed New Federal
Criminal Code, which comprises the Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws (1971) and is supplemented by three volumes of the Working Papers of the National
Commission on the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (1970-71), which in turn relies heavily on the
American Law Institute Model Penal Code. 334 N.W.2d at 814.
29. 334 N.W.2d at 814. Section 12.1-05-03 of the North Dakota Century Code states:
A person is justified in using force upon another person to defend himself against
danger of imminent unlawful bodily injury, sexual assault, or detention by such other
person, except that:
I. A person is not justified in using force for the purpose of resisting arrest,
execution of process, or other performance of du:y by a. public servant
under color of law, but excessive force may be resisted.
2. A person is not justified in using force if:
a. He intentionally provokes unlawful action by another person to cause bodily
injury or death to such other persons; or
b. He has entered into a mutual combat with another person or is the initial
aggressor unless he is resisting force which is clearly excessive in the
circumstances. A person's use of defensive force after he withdraws from an
encounter and indicates to the other person that he has done so is justified if the
latter nevertheless continues or menaces unlawful action.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 (1976).
Section 12.1-05-08 of the North Dakota Century Code states:
A person's conduct is excused if he believes that the facts are such that his conduct
is necessary and appropriate for any of the purposes which would establish a
justification or excuse under this chapter, even though his belief is mistaken.
However, if his belief is negligently or recklessly held, it is not an excuse in a
prosecution for an offense for which negligence or recklessness, as the case may be,
suffices to establish culpability. Excuse under this section is a defense or affirmative
defense according to which type of defense would be established had the facts been as
the person believed them to be.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-08 (1976).
The court in Leidholrm stated that the defense of justification is a determination that the actual
existence of certain circumstances operates to make proper and legal what would otherwise be
criminal conduct. 334 N.W.2d at 814. A defense of excuse does not make the conduct legal and
proper; instead, it acknowledges the criminality of the conduct but excuses it because the actor
actually believed circumstances existed that would justify his conduct when, in fact, they did not. Id.
at 814-15.
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unlawful harm isjustified in using this force if his belief is correct; that
is, if his belief corresponds with what actually has occurred. 30 If,
however, a person reasonably but incorrectly believes that the force
he uses is necessary to protect himself against imminent harm, his
use of force is excused.31 The court stated that this distinction may be
superfluous since the result is the same; the person avoids
punishment for his conduct. 32 Furthermore, the court stated that
because a correct belief corresponds with an actual state of affairs, it
will always be reasonable. 33 A reasonable belief, however, will not
always be a correct belief.34 Therefore, the issue under North
Dakota's law of self-defense is not whether a person's beliefs are
correct, but whether they are reasonable and thereby excused or
justified. 35 The court noted, however, that before the jury can
decide the issue of reasonableness, it must have a standard of
reasonableness by which to measure the accused's belief.
36
Courts have traditionally distinguished between objective and
subjective standards of reasonableness. 37 An objective standard of
reasonableness requires the factfinder to consider only the acts and
circumstances surrounding the accused at or immediately before
the time of the killing from the standpoint of a reasonable and
prudent person. 38 Under the subjective standard the jury need not
decide what a reasonable, prudent person believed; rather, it must
30. 334 N.W.2d at 815. For example, self-defense may bejustified when one shoots an armed
burglar breaking into one's home during the night.
31. Id. Self-defense may be excused when one mistakenly shoots a person, thought to be a
burglar, breaking into one's home during the night, when in actuality the person shot was a family
member who simply forgot his house key.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Thus, a person may reasonably believe what is not the case. Id. The court in Leidholm
noted, as an example, that "a person may reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that a gun held by an
assailant is loaded." Id. n. 3.
35. Id. at 815.
36. Id. at 8 16.
37. Id. A split of authority exists whether a defendant's actions should be measured against the
objective oi subjective standard of reasonableness. One commentator sets forth the standards as
follows:
The minority view and probably the common law rule is the subjective standard
as set forth in 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide S 154 (1968). It holds that a person claiming
self-defense must have honestly believed he was in imminent danger under all the
circumstances as he honestly perceived them. The Model Penal Code has adopted the
subjective standard. "The use of force . . . toward another person is justified when the
actor believes that such force is . . . necessary for the purpose of protecting him-
self.... " MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
The majority view is that the apprehension of danger and belief of necessity must
be a reasonable belief. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 154 (1968). The prevalant view is
that an honest but unreasonable belief concerning the necessity of self-defense merely
negates malice aforethought and reduces the offense to voluntary manslaughter.
Note, Battered Woman Syndrome: Admissibilty of Expert Testimonyfor the Defense, 47 Mo. L. REV. 835, 843
n.50. (1982).
38. 334 N.W.2d at 817.
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decide whether the circumstances surrounding the accused are
sufficient to induce an honest and reasonable belief in his mind that
he must use force to defend himself against imminent harm. 9
The court noted that neither section 12.1-05-03 nor section
12.1-05-08 of the North Dakota Century Code states whether
North Dakota adheres to the objective or subjective standard of
reasonableness.4 0 Furthermore, the legislative history of North
Dakota's self-defense statutes, as well as the commentaries to the
codified criminal statutes that form the basis of the North Dakota
Criminal Code, give no indication of which standard a court is to
apply. 41 The court, however, found guidance on this issue from
previous decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court that
developed the law of self-defense prior to the adoption of chapter
12.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code. 42 In 1907 the North
Dakota Supreme Court unanimously accepted the subjective
standard of reasonableness.4 3 As late as 1974, the North Dakota
Supreme Court confirmed that decision. 44 Thus, the court in
Leidholm concluded that the fact finder must consider "the
circumstances attending an accused's use of force from the
standpoint of the accused to determine if they are sufficient to
create in the accused's mind an honest and reasonable belief that
the use of force is necessary to protect himself from imminent
harm. ',45
The trial court, in its statement of the law on self-defense, used
the reasonable and prudent person standard. 46 Therefore, the
supreme court concluded that the trial court's instruction misstated
the law of self-defense. 47 A correct statement of the law views the
39. Id.
40. Id. at 817. For the text of N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-03 and 12.1-05-08, see supra note
29.
41. 334 N.W.2d at 817.
42. Id.
43. Id. In State v. Hazlett, 16 N.D. 426, 113 N.W. 374 (1907), the North Dakota Supreme
Court unanimously accepted the subjective standard of reasonableness because it believed it to be a
morejust standard than the objective standard. See State v. Hazlett, 16 N.D. 426, 443-44, 113 N.W.
374, 380-81 (1907).
44. 334 N.W.2d at 817. In State v. Jacob, 222 N.W.2d 586 (N.D. 1974), the North Dakota
Supreme Court confirmed the Hazlett decision adhering to the subjective standard. See State v. Jacob,
222 N.W.2d 586, 589 (N.D. 1974).
45. 334 N.W.2d at 817-18. The practical effect of this interpretation is that an accused's actions
are viewed from the standpoint of a person whose mental and physical characteristics are similar to
the accused's and who sees and knows what the accused knows. Id. The Leidholm court noted that "if
the accused is a timid, diminutive male, the factfinder must consider these characteristics in assessing
the reasonableness of his belief. If, however, the accused is a strong, courageous, and capable female,
the factfinder must consider these characteristics in judging the reasonableness of her belief." Id. at
818.
.6. Id. See supra note 10 for the instructions on self-defense given to thejury by the trial court in
Leidhoim.
47. 334 N.W.2d at 818.
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circumstances from the standpoint of the defendant alone, rather
than from the standpoint of a reasonable and prudent person.
48
The second issue raised on appeal was whether the court
should adopt a special self-defense instruction on battered woman
syndrome. 49 Leidholm offered a jury instruction on battered
woman syndrome designed to support her claim of self-defense.
50
This instruction was designed to focus the jury's attention on
victims of abusive relationships and inform the jury that it may
consider evidence that the accused suffered from battered woman
syndrome in determining whether she acted in self-defense.5 The
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the
proposed instruction would add to or significantly alter a correct
instruction on the law of self-defense. 52 Thus, it concluded that the
trial court did not need to include a specific instruction on battered
woman syndrome.53 The court further stated that a correct
instruction on self-defense would account for battered woman
syndrome.
54
Another issue raised on appeal concerned the duty to retreat.
55
The court noted that the law of self-defense limits the use of deadly
force to situations when its use is necessary to protect the actor
against death or serious bodily injury. 56 The duty to retreat,
however, has its exceptions. One exception is that a person is not
required to retreat from his dwelling, or place of work, unless the
aggressor or assailant is a co-occupant of those premises.
57
Leidholm alleged that this principle violated the equal protection
clause, the due process clause, and the privileges and immunities
48. Id. See supra note 15 for a correct statement of the law to be applied in a case of self-defense.
The court in Leidholm concluded that the trial court's instruction improperly stated the law, which
was reversible error. 334 N.W.2d at 819. The court then addressed other issues raised by Leidholm
to ensure a proper disposition of the case. Id.
49. Id. For a definition of battered woman syndrome see supra note 19.
50. 334 N.W.2d at 819. See supra note 9 for Leidholm's proposed instruction on battered
woman syndrome.
51. 334 N.W.2d at 819. Leidholm's proposed instruction correctly stated that battered woman
syndrome alone is not a defense; rather, the evidence should be considered in the context of self-
defense. Id
. 
at 819-20 (citing State v. Kelly, 33 Wash. App. 541, __ 655 P.2d 1202, 1203 (1982)).
52. 334 N.W.2d at 820.
53. Id.
54. Id. A correct instruction on self-defense requires the jury to use a subjective standard of
reasonableness in applying the principles of self-defense to the facts of a particular case. Id. It also
requires the jury to consider expert testimony, received in evidence, describing battered woman
syndrome and the psychological effects it produces, when deciding the issue of the existence and
reasonableness of the accused's belief that force was necessary to protect himself from imminent
harm. Id. Hence, the past circumstances of the battered woman are considered under the present
North Dakota self-defense standard. See supra note 15 for a correct statement of the law to be applied
in a case ofself-defense.
55. 334 N.W.2d at 820.
56. Id. (citing N.D. CENT CODE § 12.1-05-07 (2) (b) (1976)). The use of deadly force can only be
used in self-defense when one cannot retreat from his assailant without harm to himself or others. Id.
57. Id. at 820-21 (quoting N.D. CENT. COnE § 12.1-05-07 (2) (b) (2) (1976)).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 58 The court found no merit in this argument. The
court concluded that if the facts and circumstances surrounding the
accused's use of deadly force against an assailant, who is a
cohabitant, are sufficient to create in his own mind an honest and
reasonable belief that he cannot retreat from the assailant with
safety, his use of deadly force is justified or excused.
59
Leidholm next contended that it was error for the trial court to
instruct the jury that manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
murder. 60 The court stated that whether a lesser included offense
instruction is appropriate depends upon the particular facts and
circumstances of the case. 61 The court held that the trial judge's
instruction on manslaughter was warranted in Leidholm. 62 The
court further noted that whenever the court instructs a jury on self-
defense, it must include a special instruction on manslaughter as
well as negligent homicide. 6 The difference between self-defense
and manslaughter is the reasonableness of the accused's belief that
the force used was necessary to prevent imminent harm. 64 If the
accused's belief is reasonable, he acted in self-defense. 6
5  If
unreasonable, he is guilty of either manslaughter or negligent
homicide .66
58. Id. at 821. Leidholm argued that an individual's duty to retreat from his dwelling is
dependent upon the status of the assailant, which unduly discriminates against the accused if the
attacker is a cohabitant. Id.
59. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-05-07 (2) (b), 12.1-05-08. Failure to retreat has no
consequence if the defendant reasonably and honestly believed that he could not have safely retreated
from his assailant. 334 N.W.2d at 821.
60. 334 N.W.2d at 821.
61. Id. (citing State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D. 1982)). In deciding whether a
defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense, the court in Trieb stated that two
questions must be answered. First, does the instruction include an offense that is a lesser included
offense to the charge? Second, does the evidence in the particular case create a reasonable doubt as to
the greater offense and support beyond a reasonable doubt a conviction of the lesser included
offense? Trieb, 315 N.W.2d at 656.
62. 334 N.W.2d at 821. At the time of the offense in Leidholm, § 12.1-16-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code stated:
A person is guilty of manslaughter, a class B felony, ifhe:
1. Recklessly causes the death of another human being; or
2. Causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would be
murder, except that he causes the death under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there is a reasonable excuse. The reasonableness of the excuse
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in his situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be. An emotional disturbance is excusable,
within the meaning of this subsection, if it is occasioned by any provocation, event, or
situation for which the offender was not culpably responsible.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-02 (1976) (amended 1983).
63. 334 N.W.2d at 821 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-08 (1976); National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers, Comment on Excuse 271-72 (1970)).
64. 334 N.W.2d at 821.
65. Id-
66. 1d. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-05-08: National Commission on Reform of Federal
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:141
Leidholm further contended that the trial court erred in
refusing to grant a change of venue. 67 Leidholm argued that the
pretrial publicity precluded her from receiving a fair and impartial
trial. 68 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a motion for
change of venue is left to the discretion of the trial court, and this
decision will be upheld unless there is evidence of abuse of
discretion that is prejudicial to the defendant. 69 The court in
Leidholm found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of
the motion for change of venue. 
70
The final issue the court addressed was whether the trial court
erred when it denied Leidholm's motion for judgment of acquittal
at the close of the State's case. 7 Leidholm argued that the
introduction of State's Exhibit 17, notes of Dr. Thakor, a
psychiatrist, provided some evidence of insanity that rebutted the
usual presumption of sanity. Thus, the trial court should have
required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Leidholm was sane at the time of the alleged murder.72 The court
concluded that State's Exhibit 17 was insufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt on the issue of Leidholm's sanity, and therefore
the State was not required to prove Leidholm's sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt.
73
Although Leidholm raised several issues on appeal, only two
will generate any significant impact. The decision that a correct
statement of North Dakota's subjective standard of reasonableness
Criminal Laws, Final Report § 608 comment (1971); National Commission oii Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws, Working Papers. Comment on Excuse 271 (1970)).
67. 334 N.W.2d at 821. Rule 21 (a) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a motion for change of venue should be granted "if the court is satisfied that there exists in the
County or municipality where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defiendant
that lie cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial. " N.D.R. CRM. P. 21 (a) (1983).
68. 334 N.W.2d at 821. In contending that excessive pretrial publicity precluded a fair trial.
Leidhoin referred to a local newspaper's coverage of Chester's death plus selected comments of
prospective jurors (luring loir dire. Id.
69. Id. at 822.
70. Id. The Leidholm court stated that its examination of the pretrial publicity did not raise issue
with the trial court's conclusions. Id. The court noted, however, that this does not mean that a
motitiri fbr change of venue would be improper on remand, or that if nade on reminand, the trial court
muost (e]iiy it. Id. The court further stated that whether the recent publicity generated by tie past trial
or the events which led to the new trial require a change of venue is a matter ftr the trial court to
decide aiew if the issue should arise. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Leidhohn argued that because the State did inot offer any proof of sanity until after the
defense had rested, the court should have granted the motion for judgment of'acquittal. Id. Section
12.1-01-03 (2) (b) of the North Dakota Century Code states: "Subsection I does not require [the
State's] niegating a defense . . . by proof, unless the issue is in the case as a result of evidence
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-03 (2) (b) (1976).
73. 334 N.W.2d at 823. Leidholh further alleged that her mental capacity became an issue with
the introduction of State's Exhibit 17 because it contained Dr. Thakor's diagnosis that Leidholni was
suffering from a form if imenal illness, and because of contained statements made by Leidholm that
suggest that site was unaware of her actions when she stabbed Chester. Id. The court disagreed and
held that the trial court (lid not err when it denied Leidholm's motiori forjudgment of acquittal. Id.
CASE COMMENT
in self-defense is broad enough to account for battered woman
syndrome eliminates a variety of concerns. Perhaps the biggest
concern the court eliminated is the development of various special
self-defense standards for various classes of people. It is more
efficient, as well as equitable, to provide one standard that accounts
for all classes, rather than to allow special standards for each
classification.
74
Also, to allow a special standard for battered women would
raise the question of who should solve the problems of the battered
woman. The legislature, social service agencies, and the law
enforcement agencies should deal with the problem of the battered
wife, not the courts. 75 The problems should be dealt with before the
homicide occurs, by society involving itself earlier so the homicide
may be prevented. The Leidholm case indicates that North Dakota's
subjective self-defense standard is sufficient to account for battered
women, and thus, there is no need for a special self-defense
standard for battered women.
76
KRIS H. DAVICK
74. However, in states adhering to the objective standard of reasonableness in self-defense, thus
utilizing the reasonable and prudent person standard, problems with equity develop. There may be
more of a need for a special self-defense standard for battered women since the objective standard
does not account for past circumstances, whereas the subjective standard, utilized in North Dakota,
does. Hence, the implications of this case vary depending on each state's standard of reasonableness
in its self-defense laws.
75. Note, Does WifeAbuseJustify Homicide? 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1705, 1726-29 (1978).
North Dakota provides thirteen statewide projects designed to help abused spouses. Appendix
fbr Appellant at 31, Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983). These were originally started under a
grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Id. The projects provide for crisis
intervention through advocates. These advocates must be capable of listening without condemning
either the abused or the abuser and they must have a firm belief in the strength of the abused. Id.
76. 334 N.W.2d at 820.
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